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The focus of this chapter will be on the epistemic and normative questions at 
issue in debates about cancer screening, with a special focus on mammogra-
phy as a case study. Such questions include: How do we know who needs to 
be screened? What are the benefits and harms of cancer screening, and what 
is the quality of evidence for each? How ought we to measure and compare 
these benefits and harms? What are the sources of uncertainty about our esti-
mates of benefit and harm? Why are such issues so contested? What are the 
major drivers of dissent and consensus on the data and their interpretation? 
How, if at all, do values play a role in debates surrounding mammography 
screening? In sum: In what ways do inductive risk, broadly conceived,1 come 
into play in the science behind cancer screening, and mammography screen-
ing in particular?
Problems of underdetermination and thus inductive risk come into play 
in the science of mammography screening at several points: in assessing epi-
demiological data on cancer prevalence and mortality, in debating how best 
1.   Inductive risk, as defined by Heather Douglas (2000), is “risk of error” in inferring to a scientific 
hypothesis; she argues that non- epistemic values enter into scientific inquiry in cases where risk of error 
has non- epistemic consequences (i.e., in a scientific inquiry into the effects of dioxin on humans or the 
environment, or, of course, in medicine). One might speak of “epistemic risk” more broadly (following 
Biddle and Kukla, this volume) as “any risk of epistemic error that arises anywhere during knowledge 
practices.” This could include not only accepting false hypotheses but also upstream methodological 
choices, such as characterization or classification of data.
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to design trials, in evaluating the data from clinical trials, in constructing 
meta- analyses, and last but not least, in assessing how best to communicate 
about the risks and benefits of screening. From the design of studies, to the 
interpretation of results, to their application in the clinic, there are choices 
that need to be made about which risk trade- offs we are willing to tolerate— 
whether we are inferring to merely empirical hypotheses (e.g., about the 
baseline risk of cancer in group X), or more “mixed” evaluative judgments 
about overall “effectiveness” of mammography. Because these choices involve 
uncertainty, values arguably play an ineliminable role in the science support-
ing claims about the relative effectiveness of mammography screening. To 
be clear, my aim here is not to claim that the science is flawed. Rather, the 
aim is to explore the dimensions of uncertainty and inductive risk (broadly 
understood) in our estimates of benefits and costs of screening, and encour-
age greater transparency among scientists and in the public. This will ide-
ally result in more open and informed decision- making by patients and their 
families.
What Is Inductive Risk?
According to what has been called the “argument from inductive risk,” sci-
entists need to decide whether to accept or reject a hypothesis, based on 
some limited body of evidence. Such judgments can be in the wrong; one 
runs a risk of error.2 When choosing the standards of evidence required for 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses, scientists thus must weigh the impor-
tance of making various sorts of mistakes. This consideration informs scien-
tists’ methodological choices. For example, scientists might choose to avoid 
either type I or type II error, or choose different p values, such that the 
chance of error is more or less likely (Churchman 1948; Rudner 1953). That 
considerations of seriousness of error play a role in establishing standards 
of evidence is one of the main arguments for the role of values in science; 
insofar as such decisions are value- laden ones, as Richard Rudner puts it, 
“the scientist qua scientist makes value judgments” (see also Douglas 2000, 
2009; Elliott 2011).
2.   Some (Bayesian) philosophers may already resist the very idea that scientists must accept or reject 
a given hypothesis. Thus, they may argue that all that is required is that scientists assign a subjective 
degree of belief to the hypothesis. We will return to this possibility later.
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Daniel Steel (2015b) nicely characterizes the argument from inductive risk 
as follows:
 1. One central aim of scientific inference is to decide whether to accept or 
reject hypotheses.
 2. Decisions about whether to accept or reject a scientific hypothesis can have 
implications for practical action, and when this happens, acceptance deci-
sions should depend in part on nonepistemic value judgments about the 
costs of error.
 3. Therefore, nonepistemic values can legitimately influence scientific 
infer ence. (2)
Critics of this argument have rejected either premise 1 or premise 2. Richard 
Jeffrey (1956) denied premise 1 as follows: scientists are not in the business of 
accepting or rejecting hypotheses; rather, they simply assign probabilities to 
hypotheses (or, a range of probabilities), where these probabilities represent 
degrees of belief. It is up to policymakers to decide what to do with this infor-
mation. If values enter in, it is only in the context of moving from evidence 
to practical decisions about what to do. According to Jeffrey, the scientist qua 
scientist simply reports subjective degrees of belief. If Jeffrey is right, then the 
argument from inductive risk fails.
Rudner (1953) anticipated and responded to this objection, and several 
philosophers of science have echoed or elaborated upon Rudner’s reply 
(Douglas 2000, 2009; Steel 2015b; Steele 2012). For instance, Heather 
Douglas argues that contextual factors influence a much earlier stage 
of research than the interpretation of data, or reporting of probabilities, 
namely the characterization of data (Douglas 2000, 569– 72). Katie Steele 
(2012) argues that even if we grant Jeffrey’s point, when communicating 
their findings, scientists have to convert their subjective degrees of belief 
to some other measure. The translation involves a decision on the part of 
the scientist about how to report these degrees of belief; and, Steele (2012) 
argues that this is a value- laden decision. For instance, scientists have to give 
a confidence interval for some probability distribution, and “a cautionary 
approach … typically amounts to a wider credible interval. … This choice 
involves value judgments” (10). Steel (2015a) has a similar argument:
acceptance, and thus the argument from inductive risk, is already in the 
picture at the stage of deciding upon a probability model for the likeli-
hood function and prior distribution. These decisions involve a choice 
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among probability distributions: uniform, binomial, Poisson, gamma, 
beta, normal, etc. And these decisions can have consequences for what 
sorts of errors are more or less likely. Consequently . . . acceptance deci-
sions and the value judgments they entail are there from the start. (5)
In sum, Douglas, Steele, and Steel argue that even were we to grant Jeffrey’s 
view, arriving at an assignment of probabilities requires choices that make 
appeal to background assumptions, and so are at least potentially value laden. 
In Steel’s words:  “probabilistic assessments of evidence or degrees of con-
firmation themselves depend on accepting data, background knowledge, and 
probability models, and hence are also subject to the argument from inductive 
risk” (Steel 2015a, 7, emphasis added). We will return to this argument in the 
context of epidemiology of mammography screening.
Most critics of the argument from inductive risk, however, have rejected 
premise 2. As Steel notes, many have argued that “non- epistemic values should 
not influence acceptance construed in a cognitive, non- behavioral sense that 
is appropriate to science (Dorato 2004; Lacey 1999, 2004; Levi 1960, 1962, 
1967; McMullin 1982; Mitchell 2004)” (Steel 2015b, 150). Steel offers a reply 
to this objection that draws upon Jonathan Cohen’s (1992) thesis that to 
accept a proposition p in a context is to decide to treat p as an available prem-
ise for reasoning in that context. On Steel’s view, this sense of “acceptance” 
does not require that we interpret acceptance in a behavioral sense. This 
move raises some interesting questions, for example, about whether infer-
ence itself is a kind of behavior. Setting this aside, however, it does seem that 
in judgments about background beliefs we are willing to treat as premises in 
arguments that, for example, some medical intervention is more or less effec-
tive, there is an opportunity for normative values to influence one’s choice, 
whether such a choice is in terms of how we operationalize “effectiveness,” 
or perhaps that the relevant probability distribution of absolute risk in this 
case is a normal one, (even with the caveat that we take this to only have a 
probability of 80%). Steel argues that such choices shape both “upstream” 
and “downstream” stages of scientific reasoning.
While there are clearly several decision points about what to accept in var-
ious stages in the research on cancer screening, it is unclear whether we ought 
to regard them as merely choices to treat a certain proposition as a premise 
in an argument. For instance, choices of study design or the choice to exclude 
data in one’s analysis or to treat diagnoses of ductal carcinoma in situ (DCIS) 
as diagnoses of cancer are not exactly like accepting a premise. Nonetheless, 
they involve inductive risk or perhaps “epistemic risk” in the broader sense 
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discussed by Kukla and Biddle (this volume). They argue that epistemic risk, 
broadly conceived, is any risk of epistemic error that arises anywhere during 
knowledge- making practices. Such practices may involve not only inferences 
but also practical choices of research design or choices of operational mea-
sures and definitions, just to name two. Whether you characterize these more 
“practical” decisions, as well as more narrowly epistemic ones, as carrying 
“inductive” or “epistemic” risk, both clearly carry risk of over- or underestima-
tion of the benefit of screening. Both also are at least potentially value- laden. 
Below, we will consider three ways in which the assessment of mammogra-
phy’s effectiveness involves such risky choices:  choice of endpoint, design 
and assessment of trials, and estimation of one important potential harm of 
screening: overdiagnosis.
The Science of Cancer Prevention: Starting 
with Choice of Endpoint
The first step in assessing the effectiveness of any medical intervention is 
choice of outcome measured. What is it that we wish to be “effective” at? The 
choice of endpoint, or what we measure when measuring the success of an 
intervention, and how we measure it, can yield different conclusions about 
the relative effectiveness of an intervention. Not all choices of endpoint con-
verge on the same assessments of a medical intervention. Indeed, the wrong 
choice of endpoint can cause one to make very poor assessments of screening 
effectiveness, a point made especially vivid by a statement NY City Mayor 
Rudi Giuliani made in a 2007 campaign advertisement. He explained: “I had 
prostate cancer, 5, 6 years ago. My chance of surviving prostate cancer— and 
thank God, I was cured of it— in the United States? Eighty- two percent. 
My chance of surviving prostate cancer in England? Only 44 percent under 
socialized medicine” (cf. Gigerenzer et  al. 2008). Giuliani’s argument on 
behalf of US health care’s advantages is founded on a misleading measure of 
success. Five- year survival rates are the rate of survival of patients diagnosed 
with disease; for prostate cancer, these are roughly 82% in the United States 
versus 44% the United Kingdom. This may sound very compelling, until one 
considers how these rates are measured. Five- year survival is estimated by tak-
ing the number of patients diagnosed with cancer who are still alive after five 
years, and dividing by the total number diagnosed with cancer. This number, 
however, may be artificially inflated by an increase in diagnosis of early stage 
cancers, and this is exactly what happened in the case of prostate cancer in the 
United States (for a discussion, see, e.g., Gigerenzer et al. 2008).
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Early diagnosis does not necessarily mean one benefits from screening; 
in fact, early diagnosis may simply increase the amount of time one is aware 
of a disease. Consider twins John and Bill; imagine that they have the exact 
same cancer with the exact same prognosis. John is diagnosed at 65 and Bill, 
at 70. Both die at 75 from cancer. John’s early diagnosis makes it look like he 
benefited from early diagnosis, if we understand “benefit” in terms of years of 
survival from diagnosis. For, strictly speaking, he “gained” five years of sur-
vival, as a result of early diagnosis, over and above Bill’s survival from the time 
of diagnosis, even though they died at the same age. This is a case of lead- time 
bias. Lead- time bias is when a screening method appears to extend life, but in 
fact, patients are simply aware of the diagnosis for a longer period of time than 
their peers who opted out of screening.
The extreme of lead- time bias is overdiagnosis bias, the bias in estimates of 
effectiveness that comes from the diagnosis of disease that would never have 
led to symptoms in the lifetime of the patient. Overdiagnosis can occur when 
someone is diagnosed with an indolent or slow- growing disease, or, they are 
diagnosed in very old age, when the patient is more likely to die of other causes 
before the cancer can progress to clinical symptoms. Including such cases in 
estimates of screening’s preventive effectiveness is thus a serious flaw; for, no 
deaths were in fact prevented, and indeed, screening in this case can cause 
harm. Some cases of prostate cancer are indolent or relatively slow- growing; 
many men die with prostate cancer, but not of prostate cancer. Two recent 
clinical trials, one in the United States and a second in Europe, estimated that 
the number of men overdiagnosed for prostate cancer may have been as high 
as 40%– 50% (Liong et al. 2012, e45803). This rate of overdiagnosis carries 
no small cost. The quality of life for men treated for prostate cancer may be 
decreased, because standard treatment for prostate cancer involves removal of 
the prostate, which may cause incontinence or impotence, or “chemical cas-
tration” (the administration of hormones) which causes weight gain (cf. Shen 
et al. 2015). These costs of screening would be invisible if five- year survival 
rates were used as a measure of the relative effectiveness of prostate cancer 
screening.
Reduction in age- adjusted cancer mortality as an endpoint, in contrast, 
is less likely to lead to inflated ideas about the effectiveness of a screening 
regimen. Indeed, some argue that we should not be measuring cancer- related 
mortality— that is, lives lost to cancer— but overall mortality. This is because 
disease- specific reductions in mortality are not necessarily the same as reduc-
tions in overall mortality. Indeed, overall mortality may actually increase 
because of screening; for, screening itself carries some risk, either because of 
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 20 2017, NEWGEN
acprof-9780190467715.indd   154 2/20/2017   6:19:34 PM
Cancer Screening and Inductive Risk 155
the long- term effects of radiation, or biopsies and other follow- up imaging, 
following from false alarms (cf. Prasad, Lenzer, and Newman 2016). In sum, a 
more comprehensive assessment of a screening regimen’s effectiveness should, 
in principle, measure reduction of overall mortality. Indeed, a different choice 
of endpoint may result in a reversal of assessments of the overall effectiveness 
of screening. In sum, in defining a measure of “effectiveness,” we need to first 
answer the questions: What do we care about?
In sum, without attention to these forms of bias (lead time, overdiagno-
sis bias), the choice of measure for estimation of the effectiveness of screen-
ing may be misleading. This has bearing on our discussion of inductive risk. 
As Steele (2012) pointed out, scientists must make a choice about what they 
plan to measure, as well as how to communicate the results of their research. 
A scientist or policymaker who hopes to convey the effectiveness of screening 
thus might only measure five- year survival, or, relative risk reduction versus 
absolute risk reduction. That is, they may choose to represent the informa-
tion in a way that suggests that the benefits of screening far outweigh any 
potential harms. Alternately, a scientist more concerned about the potential 
harms of screening might choose to report age- adjusted reduction of mortal-
ity. A good statistician or epidemiologist understands the difference. But, all 
too often, such differences are not transparent to many readers of the litera-
ture; indeed, even clinicians misunderstand or misinterpret this basic differ-
ence between mortality and survival statistics (Gigerenzer et al. 2008). One 
could argue that choice of endpoint is a matter of science communication, 
not inductive risk, because the question at issue here is which data to report, 
not an inference to a hypothesis, as in the standard cases of inductive risk. 
However, by choosing to define or operationalize “effective” interventions as 
those which increase rates of five- year survival, one is making a value- laden 
choice that may result in overestimation of screening’s benefits and increase in 
overdiagnosis. In contrast, taking reduction of age- adjusted mortality as the 
goal of screening avoids both lead time and overdiagnosis bias.
The assessment of mammography screening’s effectiveness does not, of 
course, end with choice of endpoint. The following sections will discuss the 
assessment of the clinical trials themselves and contested estimates of one 
potential harm of screening: overdiagnosis.
Mammography Screening Trials
Governmental organizations, as well as international bodies and profes-
sional societies, such as the US Preventive Services Task Force (USPSTF) 
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and the American College of Radiology, disagree quite significantly on how 
to interpret the evidence for mammography’s effectiveness in particular age 
groups. In all these cases, competing views about the rigor of the research are 
often very difficult to separate from normative considerations, concerning 
the relative weighting of competing precautionary considerations. There are 
also quite serious differences in methodology; for instance, whether, and to 
what extent, “evidence- based” medicine versus clinical expertise ought to play 
a role in recommendations for various interventions is clearly at play in the 
mammography “wars.”3
There are several points where risk of error comes into play in the assess-
ment of mammography screening:  in the matter of deciding how best to 
select subjects to include in one’s study, in the choice of measures of poten-
tially confounding variables to consider in matching cases with controls (e.g., 
age, SES, etc.), in design of a trial (e.g., how to randomize, how many rounds 
of mammography to consider, how long to follow patients subsequent to the 
trial, whether autopsies will be conducted, whether overall mortality or only 
cancer- related mortality will be measured), and last but not least, in the over-
all assessment of the evidence (e.g., in assessments of statistical significance, 
exclusion or inclusion of data, whether DCIS cases will be considered as can-
cer diagnoses) and reporting of that evidence.
There have been eleven completed mammography screening trials, con-
ducted in Sweden, Norway, the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, 
and Singapore, according to the Cochrane collaboration (Gøtzsche and 
Jørgerson 2013). The studies each arrived at slightly different estimates of the 
benefit of mammography screening, though this is not altogether surprising, 
as the trials were conducted at different times, in different places, with slightly 
different populations (some included women as young as 40 and as old as 
75; others only investigated 50– 59), and different methods of randomization. 
These trials have been subject to a host of analyses and critiques, by national 
health services and international bodies (e.g., the Cochrane review, WHO).
The assessment of overall benefit versus harm of mammography generally 
involves meta- analyses and systematic reviews. Meta- analyses use quantita-
tive statistical techniques to synthesize the results of several studies, to yield 
what is called a “summary effect size” or single quantitative measure of the 
3.   See Solomon (2015, ch. 9), for a thoughtful discussion of how competing methodological stances 
have informed debates among different organizations regarding mammography between the ages of 40 
and 50. For an overview of how “intuitive” thinking about cancer screening has undergone refinement, 
see Croswell et al. (2010).
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effect of some intervention (Uman 2011). Meta- analyses begin with a survey 
of the available literature. Studies that are inconclusive, or, where measure of 
outcomes is not commensurable, may be excluded from consideration. Thus, 
there is a risk of error and a potential for values to enter into decision- making 
even in this relatively “pure” statistical method (cf. Ioannidis 2008; Stegenga 
2011). Systematic reviews are also based on searches of the scientific litera-
ture, with the goal of “identifying, appraising, and synthesizing all relevant 
studies on a particular topic” (Uman 2011, 57). Systematic reviews will often 
include a meta- analysis, but also include other sources of evidence, and often 
rank the quality of evidence, based on prior agreed- upon standards for assess-
ing the quality of a particular type of study. Randomized clinical trials are 
by and large regarded as the gold standard of evidence for establishing that 
various clinical interventions are effective.4 In cases where randomization is 
impossible, case- control, cohort studies, and ecological studies are consid-
ered as sources of evidence in support of linking an intervention with some 
outcome. Various organizations have established protocols for assessing the 
quality of clinical trials and for ranking and compiling such evidence in a 
systematic review. For instance, Cochrane’s acronym PICO (or PICOC)— 
Population, Intervention, Comparison, Outcomes and Context— denotes 
a set of components considered essential to the assessment of the quality of 
evidence in a systematic review. This is a kind of institutionalized attempt to 
make standards explicit, or exhibit transparency, as well as control the role of 
competing values in assessment of evidence for effectiveness of various medi-
cal interventions.
At issue in all these reviews is which studies to include, and what kinds of 
bias may have been operating in each trial, as well as whether extrapolating 
to current practice is warranted. For instance, a major concern, of radiolo-
gists in particular, is that there have been significant technological advances 
in digital mammography since these trials were conducted. Another concern 
is that the studies’ methods and quality were highly variable, and results were 
not commensurable; or, the outcome measures in different trials were not 
exactly identical— some include DCIS among cases of diagnosis of cancer, 
others only measured invasive disease. Given the extent of uncertainty about 
both the quality and import of the trials, as well as their comparability, differ-
ent institutions have arrived at different conclusions about mammography’s 
4.   For a critical discussion of RCTs as the “gold standard,” see, e.g., Cartwright (2007), Howick (2011), 
and Worrall (2002).
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benefits. And some reviews have been hugely contentious (for a point by 
point history of the Cochrane review, from the perspective of one of the par-
ticipants, see, e.g., Gøtzsche [2012], one of the co- authors).
Despite disagreement on the upshot, however, everyone who has reviewed 
the research found several potential sources of bias, even in the best, most 
well- controlled studies. Sources of potential bias included: (1) how women 
were invited to participate, (2) how they were randomized in the study, for 
example, whether the screened individuals were appropriately matched to 
controls (thus controlling for selection bias) (3) whether women excluded 
from the study either pre- or post- randomization were excluded for reasons 
that could lead to additional selection bias (e.g., excluding women who had 
already been diagnosed with breast cancer from the screened versus control 
group), (4) whether participants or personnel were adequately blinded (per-
formance bias), (5) whether autopsies were conducted on participants and 
whether cause of death assignments were blinded (detection bias), (6) whether 
there were high levels of attrition or lack of participation (attrition bias), and 
last but not least, (7) whether evidence was tampered with or handled inap-
propriately, or whether records were kept accurately.
Unfortunately, one or more of these biases were evident in even the best 
of the studies. Some studies counted the same controls twice (Stockholm); 
others excluded more women from the control than the screened group with 
previous breast cancers (Malmö); and yet others used different clinics for con-
trol versus screened groups, so that there was (arguably) a difference in socio-
economic status between groups (Edinburgh) (selection bias) (Gøtzsche and 
Jørgensen 2013). While screening appeared to show a benefit, particularly in 
women from ages 50 to 60, in many of these trials, a particularly contentious 
result of the Cochrane review was that the benefit of screening women start-
ing as early as 40, was small, if not absent altogether. This should not be alto-
gether surprising; cancer is a disease that increases in prevalence with age, and 
so, the benefit of screening to younger women is expected to be small.5
5.   Prevalence of disease is distinct from incidence. Incidence is the number of cases diagnosed in a given 
population in a specific time frame. Prevalence is the number of people with the condition at a specific 
point in time. If a disease is very low prevalence, screening is by and large unwarranted. This is because 
screening a lot of healthy people for a very rare disease, even with a highly sensitive test, is likely to turn 
up a lot of false positives. A screening test is highly sensitive when it detects most disease. That is, if the 
disease is present, the test is very likely to be positive. This comes at the expense of lots of false positives. 
In contrast, a test is specific when has few false positives, but may miss some of the disease. This is good 
if the condition is uncommon, and the cost of false positives overwhelms the advantage of finding 
disease. The positive predictive value of a screening test (PPV) is the number of true positives out of the 
total number of positive diagnoses (true + false positives).
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One of the striking features of mammography is its relatively low posi-
tive predictive value (Saslow et al. 2007). That is, mammography screening 
can rule a lot of cancers “in,” but cannot rule a lot of benign lesions “out.” 
Especially in relatively younger women, or those with fibrocystic or dense 
breasts, there are frequent “follow- up” mammograms and biopsies for suspi-
cious lesions. This is a well- known cost of screening, one that increases with 
lower prevalence. Indeed, for any screening test, even one that is highly spe-
cific and highly sensitive, if the disease is very rare (i.e., prevalence is low), 
you run the risk of many false positives. Imagine that the rate of disease in a 
population is 0.05% (the disease is rare). Out of 10,000 individuals screened, 
it turns out that even if a test is 95% sensitive and 95% specific, the test will 
still identify as many as 500 false positives.6 Thus, not surprisingly, universal 
screening for cancer is likely to identify many false positive cases in younger 
populations, where cancer is rare.
One of the main areas of contention in assessing the effectiveness of cancer 
screening is how “low you go” (i.e., how young should screening start, given 
that cancer is much less prevalent in the young?). The only way to assess this 
is to try to assign a measure of the magnitude of the benefit of screening (or 
reduced risk of mortality from breast cancer) given the baseline (or absolute 
risk of mortality from breast cancer) in any particular age group. For women 
ages 40– 49, the Cochrane review concluded that the absolute risk reduction 
was very small or none at all (Gøtzsche and Jørgerson 2013). In other words, 
given the very low prevalence of disease in this population, the absolute ben-
efit in reduction of age- adjusted mortality to younger women was very small, 
at least according to the best available trial data.
In systematic reviews determining whether the benefits of cancer screen-
ing outweigh the costs, there are very different estimates of the overall harms 
in terms of number of unnecessary tests— and false positive diagnoses— for 
different age groups. According to one estimate, “for women between the 
ages of 40 and 49 years, the false positive rate is quite high, and the expected 
benefits are quite low: more than 1900 women would need to be invited 
for screening mammography in order to prevent just one death from breast 
6.   If the disease has .05% prevalence, then 5 out of 10,000 individuals are expected to have disease. If a 
test is 95% sensitive and specific, then, 95% of the time, those found to be negative are negative, and 95% 
of the time, those found to be positive are positive. So, let’s say that almost five out of those five found 
to be positive are positive. But, it is also true that of the 9,995 of those without disease, only 9,495 are 
found to be negative (.95 × 9,995 = 9,495). But that means that roughly 500 of those found positive are 
in fact false positives, since 9,995 (TN + FP) − 9,495 (TN) = 500.
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cancer during 11 years of follow- up, at the direct cost of more than 20,000 vis-
its for breast imaging and approximately 2000 false positive mammograms” 
(Quanstrum and Hayward 2010, 1076). Perhaps needless to say, considering 
these factors at all is contentious; indeed, some contend that such psycho-
logical and financial costs should not be considered in assessments of the 
overall effectiveness of screening. The argument seemed to be that comparing 
psychological harm to mortality was simply to compare incommensurables. 
Nonetheless, the USPSTF “modeling” report attempted to quantify the rela-
tive risks and benefits of screening, based on six models that were developed 
independently within the Cancer Intervention and Surveillance Modeling 
Network (CISNET) of the National Cancer Institute (NCI) (USPSTF 
2009). They argued that the overall costs (including harms to women in their 
forties in terms of repeat mammograms, unnecessary biopsies, associated psy-
chological harm, and overdiagnosis), outweighed the marginal benefits (in 
terms of mortality reduction) to women. Critics objected to everything from 
which harms to include, to how to measure them, to whether it was morally 
objectionable to compare resource costs with lives saved.
Despite their differences, in 1997, and yet again in 2009, the USPSTF 
(2009), and the Cochrane review (Gøtzsche and Jørgerson 2013) arrived at 
relatively similar recommendations. The USPSTF panel concluded that the 
evidence suggested that “routine” (i.e., annual or biannual) screening for 
women under 50 was not worth the overall cost. Instead, patients under 50 
ought to consult with a physician to discuss the benefits and risks of routine 
screening, given their individual risk factors (family history, parity, smoking 
habits, etc.). Moreover, they argued that the benefits of biannual screening are 
most evident for populations in the age range of 50– 74. In this, they followed 
the Cochrane’s review.
These reviews were met with a firestorm of opposition. The American 
Cancer Society, the American College of Radiology, the Society for Breast 
Imaging, and the Radiology Society of North America all rejected these con-
clusions, and recommended routine screening for women in their forties.7 In 
Europe, the Cochrane review process was delayed, and even before the final 
review was produced, a paper published in the Lancet (Gøtzsche and Olsen 
2000) created a huge stir. One issue that arose again and again was what to 
7.   At least until recently: The ACS pulled back from their initial resistance to the USPSTF’s results in 
the summer of 2015 (Oeffinger et al. 2015). However, the Society for Breast Imaging and the American 
College of Radiology (ACR 2015) continues to recommend cancer screening in women ages 40– 50, 
despite the ACS’s reversal.
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include among overall costs and benefits assessed. In particular, the measure 
of the extent of overdiagnosis and its consideration as a cost, and relatedly, 
estimates of baseline prevalence, were a significant point of contention.
Measuring Overdiagnosis
In order to assess screening’s effectiveness in reducing mortality from a par-
ticular type of cancer, one needs an estimate of background or baseline inci-
dence and mortality from this particular cancer in this population (a group 
of individuals with a particular age range, or sex). That is, one needs to know 
how many individuals would have gotten cancer, and how many of these 
would die from cancer without screening. But, once screening has already 
become the standard of care, estimates of baseline incidence and mortality 
are difficult to arrive at. Various indirect sources of evidence of varying quality 
are thus appealed to, including historical epidemiological data and long- term 
follow- up data from the original clinical trials. Which such data to trust, and 
how decisive it is, is a contentious matter. For instance, one estimate of base-
line incidence is arrived at by subtracting “catch- up” cancers in unscreened 
groups from the total cancers in the screened group, as measured in the origi-
nal clinical trials.
The authors of the Cochrane review used this method to estimate rates 
of overdiagnosis and arrived at a strikingly high number, 30% (Gøtzsche and 
Jørgerson 2013). Perhaps not surprisingly, radiologists in particular have been 
skeptical of Cochrane’s estimates of overdiagnosis (Detterbeck 2012; Kopans, 
Smith, and Duffy 2011). Some argue that there was insufficient “follow- up” 
time in measures of compensatory drop in mortality in the screened groups, 
or that variability in overdiagnosis estimates be explained by differences in 
screening policies and different uptake between programs (see, e.g., Kopans, 
Smith, and Duffy 2011). This is an instance of how acceptance of very dif-
ferent background beliefs, or what comparison and contrast is considered 
relevant to assessment of a given outcome, may well be informed by values. 
In the name of scientific rigor (e.g., challenging that we can extrapolate from 
baseline rates of cancer incidence and mortality in the past to the present), 
one can deny that such evidence is relevant to current estimates of screenings’ 
benefits. But it is difficult to separate such epistemic norms from normative 
values; for, radiologists have a vested interest in insisting on screening’s effec-
tiveness (Quanstrum and Hayward 2010).
In addition, many remain skeptical of the possibility that some cancers are 
simply unlikely to progress. However, the concerns raised about overdiagnosis 
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have led some organizations to rethink how to categorize early stage cancer. 
An NIH working group recommended that indolent lesions be renamed 
“IDLE,” indolent lesions of epithelial origin (see, e.g., Esserman et al. 2014). 
This seems a clear case of a shift in priorities regarding inductive risk; the NIH 
is erring on the side of caution with respect to overdiagnosis. Emphasizing 
that extremely early stage diseases are unlikely to progress may well prevent 
overdiagnosis and overtreatment. At issue in estimates of overdiagnosis are 
thus background assumptions about the possibility of indolent disease, as 
well as the legitimacy of extrapolation from various sources of evidence about 
background incidence and mortality. There are three sources of this evidence, 
all of which are contested: autopsy data, historical RCTs, and historical data.
Consider the evidence for overdiagnosis that comes from autopsies. 
Autopsy studies have found a significant disease reservoir of subclinical can-
cers in otherwise healthy individuals. Two studies, one of American men, and 
the other a study of Greek men (all of whom died from causes other than can-
cer) determined that the disease reservoir of prostate cancer ranges from 30% 
to 70% (Welch and Black’s 2010 estimate, citing Sakr et al. 1996 and Stamatiou 
et al. 2006; see also Santen, Yue, and Heitjan 2013). As might be expected, the 
disease reservoir of cancer was significantly age- dependent. Another study of 
thyroid cancer found disease reservoirs as high as 100% (Welch and Black’s 
2010 estimate, citing Harach, Franssila, and Wasenius 1985). A further study 
of breast cancers in middle- aged women who died from other causes found 
ranges from 7% to 39% (Welch and Black 1997; see also Santen, Yue, and 
Heitjan  2013). To be clear, these were all very early stage and in many cases 
likely slow growing or indolent disease; in contrast, the lifetime risk of meta-
static disease is significantly lower than 30%– 70%. It follows that screening 
may detect a significant percentage of cancers (overdiagnoses) that may never 
have resulted in clinical symptoms, disease or death (cf. Welch and Black 
2010), especially in younger patients.
The second major source of evidence is long- term follow- up studies count-
ing “catch- up” cancers in the unscreened groups, following completion of 
clinical trials. The difference between the number of catch- up cancers in the 
unscreened group and the total number discovered through screening is the 
absolute number of those overdiagnosed. Welch and Black (2010) estimate 
that this number in breast cancer could be as high as 24% for the Malmo 
trial (608). Critics of estimates based on this data contend that the authors 
did not follow the cohort long enough to detect a compensatory decline in 
mortality in the screened group (see, e.g., Kopans, Smith, and Duffy 2011; 
Puliti et al. 2012).
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 20 2017, NEWGEN
acprof-9780190467715.indd   162 2/20/2017   6:19:34 PM
Cancer Screening and Inductive Risk 163
Critics also argue that the defenders of high estimates of overdiagno-
sis were unreasonably assuming that background incidence rates are sta-
ble and extrapolating forward to current rates. They claim that there may 
well have been a “natural increase in incidence” (cf. Kopans, Smith, and 
Duffy 2011) across relevant time period(s), which would confound estimates 
of the extent of overdiagnosis in current practice. To be sure, this argument is 
a bit ad hoc; there is no special reason to think that rates of cancer incidence 
were increasing over this time, in a way that just happened to coincide with 
increasing rates of cancer screening. Nevertheless, the extent of disagreement 
in estimates of overdiagnosis is illustrated in a 2012 paper by Donella Puliti 
et al. in the Journal of Medical Screening where they discuss twenty different 
estimates of overdiagnosis in breast cancer, ranging from less than 10% to as 
high as 60%. Here is a case where inductive risk comes into play; the source 
of evidence for background rates of incidence and mortality, and so choice of 
one means of measuring overdiagnosis versus another may lead to either over- 
or underestimating the harms of screening. Different estimates of overdiagno-
sis are based on different estimates of baseline prevalence, and the evidence in 
support of these estimates of baseline prevalence varies in source and quality. 
Perhaps needless to say, the skepticism with which some critics regard high 
estimates of overdiagnosis is at least prima facie motivated by value. One can 
only imagine the strength of disincentive at work against acknowledging that 
as many as 60% of one’s patients were diagnosed and treated unnecessarily for 
cancers that would never have progressed to symptoms. Perhaps the serious-
ness of harm involved is what stands behind the vicious tone in many of the 
exchanges over mammography and overdiagnosis in medical journals; it is not 
surprising that these debates have been dubbed the “mammography wars.”
Concluding Considerations
The ultimate question at issue in the “mammography wars” is twofold: First, 
what is the best estimate of the actual outcomes of mammography in dif-
ferent age groups? Second, how do we assign values to these outcomes and 
weigh them against one another in our assessments of whether mammogra-
phy screening is “effective,” especially given the extent of our uncertainty? As 
a matter of public health, this has the danger of becoming a kind of cost- 
benefit calculation: how many cancer- related deaths need we prevent to jus-
tify screening? One per 1,900 screened? One per 1,300 screened? How ought 
we to weigh the harms to those screened, and how ought we to weight the 
relative value of “mere” psychological harms (such as those associated with 
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anxiety over false positives) versus more serious harms (such as overdiagnosis 
and overtreatment)?
At issue in much of the controversy over mammography is not only how 
to interpret the evidence, but arguably, a basic disagreement over matters of 
justice. With any screening regimen in a healthy population (and indeed, 
with any preventive intervention), Rose’s paradox arises (see, e.g., John 2011). 
Rose’s paradox is that it is an inevitable feature of any public health measure 
that most people screened are not in fact likely to benefit from participat-
ing. Thus, screening a healthy population is like a “contract”: we ask those 
involved to participate, in order to reduce overall risk, though few will actu-
ally benefit. (Of course, providers of the preventive care will benefit.) So, the 
question becomes: How much of a cost ought we ask the public to bear for 
a very small chance of benefiting? If the cost is minor inconvenience or side 
effects with very little chance of long- term consequences, many people may 
be willing to bear this burden. Yet, if the cost is overdiagnosis and overtreat-
ment, how many should be asked to bear this burden? This issue is not a novel 
one, nor is it unique to cancer screening; indeed, it pervades modern “risky” 
medicine— the treatment of early stage disease or “pre- ” disease with various 
drugs and aggressive interventions. Such aggressive extension of preventive 
care benefits pharmaceutical companies, but does not in fact benefit most 
patients. Whether such aggressive preventive care is optimal depends upon 
whether you think that the aim of medicine is treatment of disease, or risk 
reduction at the population level (for a discussion, see, e.g., Aronowitz 2015).
Competing views about just this issue are arguably informing very differ-
ent perspectives on how to assess the evidence regarding the benefits and costs 
of cancer screening. These perspectives shape both evaluation of evidence 
regarding benefits of mammography, assessment of whether and which costs 
are serious enough to be tolerable, and communication of results. Reports 
and reviews of research on mammography may favor weighing the evidence 
in one direction versus another, whether because of exclusion or inclusion of 
evidence, different assessments of quality of evidence, or even simple mat-
ters of organization in presentation of data. One might open with estimates 
of overall mortality reduction rather than age- specific, thus obscuring the 
important differences among age groups; or, one might bury estimates of 
costs in the body of the paper, or foreground risks of screening, by including 
a detailed description in the abstract. These choices are not merely stylistic; 
they represent both the authors’ values, which shape both their estimates of 
the seriousness of benefit and risk, and the quality of the evidence. In this way, 
inductive risk is very much at play in this case.
OUP UNCORRECTED PROOF – FIRSTPROOFS, Mon Feb 20 2017, NEWGEN
acprof-9780190467715.indd   164 2/20/2017   6:19:34 PM
Cancer Screening and Inductive Risk 165
Also at stake are norms of medicine and competing views about whether 
and when “paternalist” medicine is justified. In principle, respect for patient 
autonomy is important, so women should be informed of risks and ben-
efits of mammography screening; and, both risks and benefits should be 
communicated as clearly as possible. But, some argue on pragmatic grounds 
that most members of the public are either unwilling or unable to ratio-
nally assess their options, let alone be compliant with recommendations, so 
“nudging” them toward one or another option is permissible. Yet, if some 
percentage of those “nudged” are in turn overdiagnosed and overtreated, 
on the pretense that they will benefit, then arguably, a genuine injustice 
is done. At issue here then are fundamentally philosophical disagreements 
about justice, harm, autonomy, and beneficence, and the role of the physi-
cian with respect to both individual patients and the patient population 
more generally.
Given the extent of disagreement, and the rapidity with which medi-
cal evidence for and against various screening methods arrive on the scene, 
rather than adopt a uniform program of screening by age, it may be advisable 
to adopt a much more pluralistic approach, one which attends to the fact 
that patients are variable, that evidence is defeasible, and that novel technol-
ogy, methods, and sources of evidence are likely to challenge our standards 
for what works. To be sure, adapting screening recommendations regularly, 
as new information arises about biomarkers for aggressive cancers, or organ-
ismic and developmental factors that indicate a risk of progression, will 
become necessary. Indeed, perhaps for most interventions (according to a 
recent paper by Quanstrum and Hayward 2010), rather than seeking a single, 
universal threshold for intervention, we should be arguing over a minimum 
of two distinct thresholds: one above which benefit clearly outweighs the 
risk of harm, in which case clinicians should recommend a treatment; and 
one below which concern about harm clearly dominates, in which case clini-
cians should recommend against that treatment. This approach is similar to 
Mitchell’s (2009) adaptive management approach to risk, where appreciation 
of uncertainty, and willingness to update in light of new evidence, might be a 
better model for medical decision- making. Putting such policy into practice 
requires, however, that clinicians acknowledge the extent of uncertainty in 
estimates of the effectiveness of cancer screening. This is a new paradigm for 
medicine and medical communication, however, one that is very difficult to 
adapt to by patients (and clinicians) who want medical decision- making to be 
black and white. Whether and how we are best prepared for this new para-
digm is an open question.
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In sum, there are several points at which inductive risk enters into can-
cer epidemiology, not simply at the end of the investigation when deciding 
upon policies of mammography screening, but at several stages in research: in 
choices about which endpoints to investigate and report, in design and assess-
ment of the quality of research, and in disputes over the best means to mea-
sure one particular harm, overdiagnosis. Moreover, the matter of how to best 
communicate about risk itself depends on background assumptions about 
human psychology, as well as competing normative intuitions.
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